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PARTY GOVERNMENT: A RATIONALISTIC CONCEPTION.

by

RICHARD S. KATZ

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I - 50016 San Domenico (FI)

Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception

Richard S. Katz

Department of Political Science
The Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland 21218

That political parties have been the central institutions of democratic governments at least since the enfranchisement of the working class is well known. Disraeli wrote, "I believe that without party parliamentary government is impossible" (Rose, 1974: 1). Schattschneider (1942: 1) tells us that "modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of party," while to Sartori (1976: ix), "Parties are the central intermediate and intermediary structures between society and government." Although as Rose (1969) points out, "operational control of government" by parties is often assumed rather than demonstrated, the literary theory (as Bagehot would have it) or the dominant ideal-type or myth of democratic government in Western Europe has been the model of party government. While party government has not been accepted quite so readily as a description of government in the United States, it has been widely accepted as an ideal there as well (Kirkpatrick, 1950). With varying degrees of sophistication and with more or fewer caveats, elaborations, and qualifications, this has been true of political scientists, journalists, and the general public. The character, as well as the success or failure of governments both in solving particular problems

and in providing effective long term stability and leadership, is most commonly attributed to the state of the parties and party system (Briggs, 1965; Allum, 1973).

Like other idealisations of government -- for example first that the king and then that the legislature ruled -- the party government model is both descriptive and justificatory.[1] At the descriptive level, the party government model assigns to political parties a number of key functions in the governing process, including mobilisation and channeling of support, formulation of alternatives, recruitment and replacement of leadership, and, when in power, implementation of policy and control over its administration. At the normative level, the party government model implies a particular view of democracy, in which the system is made democratic by the electoral role of the parties. Structures or individuals other than parties and their leaders could perform the functions attributed to parties and could contribute to the governing of society, but only parties offer the whole public a choice among comprehensive and comprehensible alternatives. An electorally victorious party or coalition of parties is entitled to control the decision making and implementing functions of government because it has been authorised by the whole people to do so (Ranney, 1962).

The preceding paragraph ignores many thorny problems. Like other idealisations, the party government model is oversimplified, and is not intended to be taken as a complete description of any particular government. Its English origins are quite obvious, and both its descriptive and its normative elements require modification before they can be adapted to other political systems. Nonetheless, until recently it was generally accepted as a desirable ideal and also as a reasonably accu-

rate description of the operation of European, if not necessarily of American, democracy.

In recent years, however, widespread concern has been expressed generally about the governability of industrial or post-industrial societies, and particularly about the ability of parties and party governments to cope with contemporary problems (Crozier, 1975). A variety of events, social changes, and results of academic research have called the party government model into question, both normatively and empirically. Heightened awareness of the independence of bureaucrats and of their relationships with organised interests has raised the question of whether parties have been, or can be, in effective control of policy. The broadening of government functions and the proliferation of governmental and quasi-governmental agencies indeed has raised the question of whether anyone can exercise comprehensive control. The rise of social groupings and issues not reflected in existing party systems has introduced new strains that threaten the stability of existing institutions and raised doubts regarding the adequacy of representation by parties (Inglehart, 1977), while the effective penetration of organised groups into the governmental apparatus has challenged the assumption that parties are necessary for representation. Moreover, the suspicion that partisan bickering is responsible, at least in part, for the apparent incapacity of western governments to deal effectively with contemporary problems has raised doubts about the very desirability of party government (Finer, 1975).

These doubts have contributed to a feeling that there is a crisis brought about by a lack of <u>capacity</u> on the part of the <u>parties</u> which is

threatening the survival of party government and of democracy. This suggestion raises questions clustering in three main categories. Firstly, to what extent, and under what circumstances, do governments conform to the party government model? Put somewhat infelicitously, what is the level of "party governmentness" of contemporary regimes, how is it to be explained, and, projecting into the future, what changes in party governmentness should be expected on the basis of other political, social, economic, and cultural developments? Secondly, how and under what circumstances is the level or organisation of party government related to a political system's capacity and potential for survival? Thirdly, is party government necessary for democracy or, less demandingly, is party government the only alternative to authoritarian, autocratic, or dictatorial government? How much party government is there; can it survive; should one care?

These questions could be approached as historical descriptive problems to be addressed relatively atheoretically. There is much still to be said about the role of parties in the governing of past and present societies at a purely descriptive level. If valid cross-national comparisons are to be made, if events are to be explained, and especially if an assessment of the consequences of potential or future events rather than only those that have already occurred is to be attempted, however, a more developed theoretical framework will be necessary. In this paper, I want to explore one possible such framework. The remainder of the paper is divided into three main sections. The first section is concerned with the choice of an overall theoretical approach, or paradigm. The second section then addresses some conceptual problems, in particular the definition of the terms

underlined in the last paragraph. Finally, the purpose of the third section is to relate these concepts to one another, drawing theoretical connections among them and suggesting hypotheses and a framework for interpretation. Although examples will be given when possible, since this is primarily a theoretical paper rigorous tests of hypotheses will be left to future research.

Choice of Paradigm

Before any definitional problems can be resolved or theoretical propositions advanced, one must choose the paradigm within which the work will take place. This involves deciding on the nature of the universe to be explained or studied -- the "units" or "things" out of which it is made, the kinds of relationships that are important, and the forces that might produce or modify those relationships. In effect, a paradigm is a framework for the construction of an empirical theory and the choice of a paradigm is the choice of the language in which the theory will be built and the research carried out. Although research based on one paradigm may be useful to work in another, all but the barest facts (and sometimes those as well, depending on operational definitions of concepts) require translation. For example, Fiorina (1981) can make frequent use of the party identification variable from the Michigan surveys in his basically rationalistic account of American electoral choice, even citing figures computed by those using other approaches. His theoretical definition of party identification, however, is quite different from theirs and so too is his interpretation of those figures.

Paradigms are not falsifiable. They provide structures within which falsifiable empirical hypotheses may be formulated but have no empirical content themselves. Rather, a paradigm is judged by its usefulness, that is by whether the theories advanced within it are verified and whether it contributes to understanding. Ultimately, the test of a theory, and thus indirectly the measure of its parent paradigm's usefulness, is the "objective" standard of accuracy. To date, however, no social science theory has achieved a level of accuracy such that it can stand on that ground alone. Thus, "generality, plausibility and auxilliary implications" must remain important bases for judging theories and choosing paradigms (Fiorina, 1981: 190).

Unfortunately, one implication of this is that the choice of paradigms is largely a matter of taste based on intuition. Moreover, the paradigm that appears most useful for studying one class of phenomena may be different from that which appears most useful for another (Kaplan, 1964: 258-326). It is not surprising, then, that there has been no consensus reached within political science, or even within its subfields. If cumulative progress is to be made, however, this problem must be resolved.

This paper is not the place to debate the relative merits of all the competing paradigms in political science, a task which has been undertaken elsewhere (Barry, 1970; Holt and Richardson, 1970). Instead, in this section I only want to lay out the basic elements of the paradigm I propose to adopt, that is the rationalistic (in Barry's terms, the economic) paradigm.

The basic unit for the rationalistic approach is the goal-oriented rational actor. Goal-oriented actors are individuals who perceive that they have goals and whose actions are motivated by a desire to achieve those goals. People do not just act, they act so as to bring about a situation that they value more rather than one that they value less; if there is behavior that cannot be regarded as purposive, it is inexplicable within the rationalistic framework. Rationality implies that in attempting to further their goals, actors always try to maximise their attainment with the minimum expenditure of resources. As Locke (1975, section 131) put it, "no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse."

Stopping here, one would not have said much, for it seems apparent that all behavior is rational. Indeed, if a psychotic's withdrawal from reality lessens his pain, even that would be rational (Kelley, 1957). Unless the goals being pursued are known or assumed, the rationalist can do little beyond vacuous or ex post explanations of the form "He did what he did because he wanted to." Rationalistic work advances beyond this by specifying the ends to be pursued, but at this point one advances from the level of paradigm to that of specific theories. The problem of what goals to consider with specific reference to a theory of party government is discussed below.

It is important to be clear as to what this notion of a goal-oriented rational actor does not imply. Firstly, it does not imply that an individual's goals will be mutually compatible in the sense of being achievable simultaneously. There may be trade-offs necessary in any particular choice of action; one can with perfect rationality desire

both low taxes and a high level of public expenditure for education. Indeed, the basic assumption of the most rationalistic of the social sciences, economics, is that people simultaneously desire both guns and butter in incompatible quantities. (See, however, Converse, 1964: 209.) Secondly, it does not imply that an individual's goals are sensible as seen by an outside observer. Some goals are simply matters of taste; that I consider something to be objectionable, immoral, or self-destructive does not preclude its pursuit by someone else. Other goals are instrumental and thus based on reality judgments. In this case, an objective observer might decide that they were foolish or mistaken, but this raises the third point. Rational actors are not assumed to be omniscient; indeed the costs of obtaining reliable information may be such that a rational individual would consider a blind guess to be more cost effective than an informed judgment. Fourthly, rational actors need not make involved cost-benefit analyses before taking every action. Rules of thumb and standard operating procedures are rational if they have been proven satisfactory by experience, either real or vicarious. The search for an optimal strategy may prove suboptimal if excessive search and decision costs are incurred. What is assumed is that individuals behave <u>as if</u> they made cost-benefit analyses based on the goals they choose to pursue, with the resources available to them, and in the circumstances in which they find themselves.[2]

The rationalistic paradigm is self-consciously individualistic. Neither groups nor organisations exist as primary units within its framework. Instead, they are viewed fundamentally as collections of individuals whose cooperation or cohesion must be explained (Olson, 1965). In an fully elaborated theory, organisations would be dependent

phenomena rather than individual actors; organisation is a strategy that may be pursued by some sets of individuals.

This does not mean that organisations or social groups may not enter rationalistic theories for analytic simplicity. Theory building and testing within the rationalistic paradigm proceeds by successive approximations. Simplifying assumptions regarding the nature of the actors, the goals they pursue, the environment in which they operate, or the strategies open to them are posited, and, on the basis of the consequent model, hypotheses are deduced concerning their behavior. These are tested and to the extent that predictions fail to fit reality the model is modified. In considering the interactions among organisations, it may be productive initially to regard them as unitary actors. Downs' (1957) treatment of parties is a classic example of this. Although many suggestive conclusions could be derived from this simplification, many anomolies remained. Others (e.g., Robertson, 1976) later relaxed this assumption, obtaining a closer fit with reality.

Organisations and institutions may also play a role in rational theories as exogenous or situational variables. From the point of view of the individual(s) whose behavior is to be explained, an organisation may appear to be a fixed structure like any other institution. Behavior is decided on and takes place within an institutional structure. Since this partially determines the results of any particular pattern of behavior, it influences the likelihood that such behavior will occur. For example, behavior on the part of a candidate that would be rewarded in a proportional representation system might be counterproductive, and so less likely, in a plurality system. Cultural expectations similarly

condition the expected responses from others and anticipation of those responses will influence the actor's initial choice of behavior. Social and economic variables may be considered in the same way.

Social structure may also be relevant to a rationalistic theory through its influence on the goals of individuals. While the rationalistic paradigm does not recognise social classes as entities distinct from the individuals who comprise them, commonality of socializing experiences and similarity of objective situations may lead members of a social class to have similar interests and goals. Moreover, among the values inculcated by these experiences may be a subjective identification and consequent desire for group solidarity and conformity to perceived group norms. Again, however, class solidarity and class consciousness are seen not as natural but as needing explanation. Similarly, while "working class Tories" may be exceptional in some countries, the rationalistic paradigm does not regard them as theoretical anomolies.

The rationalistic paradigm is a way of looking at the world and a style of explanation. In this view, whatever the ultimate influence exercised by social forces or institutional/organisational arrangements, the immediate cause of a political event is always the conscious choice of individual human beings. While social, economic, cultural, or political differences may lead individuals who are otherwise similarly placed and pursuing the same goals to make different choices, it is only through those choices that the influence of impersonal forces can be manifested.

Conceptual Problems

Party

The consequences of adopting a rationalistic approach begin to appear as soon as we think about parties. In general terms, there are two different ways in which parties may be viewed. The one most common among adherents of the various "sociological" approaches, and the one often implicit in analyses of the functions of political parties or in assertions that parties do, or ought to do, certain things, as well as in comparisons of the behavior or "gestalt" of different types of parties, is to see each party as an organic entity. In this view, parties seek to control the government and, in this attempt, may either conflict or cooperate with other organisations or structures in society such as mass media, bureaucracy, interest groups, business firms, and the military.

From the rationalistic perspective, however, party must be seen as a "they" rather than as an "it." Moreover, once one tries to develop a rigorous theory or to operationalise the concepts necessary for empirical research, the corporate view of party leads to great difficulties. Two may be mentioned here. The first concerns the coherence of party. If party is to be regarded as a whole, it ought to be possible, for example, to identify its goals. As constant conflict and debate within the British Labour party makes clear, however, it is not always a simple task to identify a party's authoritative voice so as to identify its goals. Similarly, in factionalised parties the decision of constitutionally authorised party organs may not bind the party's constituent parts.[3] Far from rescuing the corporate view, attempts to regard each

party as a microcosmic political system simply underline the inadequacy of the original conceptualisation.

This is underscored by the second problem which is in many ways even more difficult. The corporate view must assume parties to have distinct boundaries that set them apart from other structures (Eldersveld, 1964: 1). In fact, there is obviously a deep interpenetration of these supposedly rival and autonomous power sources. What, for example, is one to make of the situation in which a church or trade union controls policy by creating a "captive" political party to do its bidding? Although the British Labour party has grown more autonomous than it was originally, the trade unions still dominate its conference. Is it a separate institution or an arm of the trade union movement? If the bishops dictate policy to a christian democratic party, is the church simply a successful pressure group, or is the party an arm of the church? And what of the converse case, when a party creates ancillary organisations that behave like other interest groups? Is the Italian CGIL the Communist party in another form or an autonomous and potentially rival group? In either case, total autonomy and total subservience are both overstatements; there are both connections and differences. This reality is easily lost in viewing party as a distinct organism.

The alternative view is to deny the independent existential basis of party, as well as of other groups. Instead, party is seen as an organisation of, or structured pattern of interactions among, individuals in pursuit of their own goals. Rather than being an independent actor, party is an instrument or conduit or basis of influence used by individuals. In this case, one properly speaks of functions being

performed within or through political parties rather than by them. Especially, one is alerted to the possibility that "party functions" might be performed elsewhere or not at all, even while organisations calling themselves parties exist.

This highlights a clear problem with functional definitions of parties. If parties are defined by their functions, party nonfeasance becomes a logical impossibility. Likewise, it becomes impossible for the defining functions of parties to be performed by any other institution since it would thereby become a party. One may, of course, still refer to the functions of political parties in the sense of "things done by individuals through the mechanism of party" and be concerned with the importance of those things and of having them done by parties for the political system.[4] As Smith (1982) observes, however, "It is one thing to provide a functional 'check-list,' but quite another to imply that a party, a party system or an arrangement of party government exists in order to 'perform' certain functions. The approach readily lends itself to distortion. It implies some kind of over-arching system rationality without ever being called upon to demonstrate its presence....Without necessarily committing itself, the functional ordering additionally takes on a static emphasis, tending to look for a fixed relationship between structure and function." While the rationalistic approach assumes that individual actors are rational, it makes no assumptions about the "rationality of the system," and indeed research has shown that individual rationality may lead to collective irrationality (Hardin, 1968).

What kind of an organisation is a party and how is it distinguished

from other structured patterns of interaction? The answer lies in the functions of political parties, not for the political system as in a functional analysis, but for those who use them. Political parties developed in the nineteenth century with the rise of mass suffrage and regularised political participation. They were created to support and assist their organisers who were already in government (in the case of parties of intraparliamentary origin) or who wished to get into government (parties of extraparliamentary origin).[5] They replaced combinations of members of parliament who supported or opposed the government of the day on the basis of their personal interests or preferences, the interests or preferences of their sponsors, or in return for particularistic rewards. Party represents a strategy by which support in the mass public may be curried and converted into political power in an electorally oriented democratic society. The key change was ultimate dependence on popular election, and the central distinction between parties and other groups is that they contest elections and rely on their success in elections for their claim to legitimate participation in government.

Left at this, personal campaign organisations would qualify as political parties, and to a limited extent and especially in presidential systems they do. Presidential systems require special treatment because personal and party victory in a presidential election are synonymous; whichever person/party wins that one election wins control of the executive branch of government.[6] In parliamentary systems -- and in the legislative branch of presidential systems -- the real prize comes not from a single candidate's victory, but from the formation of a legislative majority. Political parties are further

distinguished by their cooperative seeking of majorities, and the concomitant right and obligation collectively to govern and to be held responsible for governing.

Fundamentally, parties represent to the voters alternative teams of rulers and to the members of those teams a device for mobilising support to compete with the members of other teams. The basis of this competition may be programmatic or ideological, but it need not be. In particular, conservative parties may have no concrete program, only a broad philosophy and a belief in their own ability to rule in the national interest (Beer, 1969: 99; Amery, 1953: 4-31). Other parties may have no articulated goal beyond supporting a particular leader. The party politician is committed, or acts as if he were committed, to a cooperative quest for power, not just a personal quest for office, while the party voter is voting for a team in addition to a particular candidate.

This conception of party has obvious roots in the responsible parties doctrine. In that notion, parties are the link between the public as a whole and the government as a whole. For parties to serve this function, voters must be able to treat them as collective entities. Only if parties behave cohesively in the discharge of public office, and only if their candidates are prepared to stand or fall as a team on the basis of the party's collective record in office and proposals for the future can voters, whose electoral vocabulary is necessarily limited, have a chance to speak effectively (Lowell, 1913: 67-69; Schattschneider, 1942: 52). Party is defined here with at least an eye toward this theory.

In admitting this, it becomes necessary to consider three further

questions. The first concerns the nature of party unity and indirectly the question of internal party "democracy" in the case of parties with mass memberships. The "party democrats" have seen parties as "huge associations of partisan voters," and have insisted that they be internally democratic (Schattschneider, 1942: 54; Kirkpatrick, 1950: 22-23). This has naturally raised some complaints that internal party competition is incompatible with collective action in government. While this point may be valid empirically, it is theoretically possible to argue that internal party democracy requires not only that there be competition within the party but also that all party people, including the losers of this internal competition, behave cohesively vis-a-vis the external world in support of the victorious position. It is only this point that is required by partyness. Whatever the internal organisation or rules of the party, and whatever the level of consensus or dissensus among party people, in their relations with nonparty individuals and groups, those following a party strategy of political action must behave as a team.

The second question concerns the nature of the competition among those teams. The responsible parties theory of democracy generally is associated with the requirement that parties present clear and distinctive platforms, spelling out the policies they will follow in office. Because the party that wins an election (assuming a single party does achieve a majority) can be trusted to put its manifesto into practice, this allows voters to exercise <u>prospective</u> control over policy. Parties might, however, compete on the basis of their records in office, in which case the control exercised by voters would be <u>retrospective</u>, and might be based either on policies or on outcomes

(Fiorina, 1981: chap. 1). Indeed in the last case, the choice of the voters -- and correspondingly the competition among the parties -- may be based on confidence in a particular team of leaders without necessary regard for the policies they have pursued in the past or would pursue in the future. While these differences are important, they do not bear on a party's claim to that name. All that is required is collective accountability, made possible by the expectation of collective action in office.

The third question concerns party membership. Who is the party? Most broadly, one could argue that a party consists of everyone who votes for or sympathises with it. Demands for internal democracy based on an institution like the American direct primary implicitly assume this view. Except for reaching an electoral decision, it is hard to imagine such an "organisation" taking any sort of collective action; "members" make no promises of loyalty and may not have even to admit their membership publicly; there can be no regular communication among members, only from leaders to followers; no sanctions can be imposed against deviants. A more restricted view would be to look only at formal members in the European card-carrying sense, but this implies a mass membership party. Even this, however, confuses supporters with participants. Although the individualistic orientation renders the whole problem of only marginal concern, the view taken here is that the leadership is the party, and when party is discussed as an actor, it is to the collective leadership that reference is meant. This is the only group small enough and in sufficiently constant communication that consciously concerted action is possible. This is not to deny the

importance of mass membership in some parties, and of the decisions of supporters for all parties. Members may take many policy decisions -- although always subject to the interpretation of party leaders. They may also choose the leaders. Nonetheless, they are no more "the party" than citizens are "the government" in representative democracies. Finally, as suggested above, mass membership is not necessary for a party at all.

The three requirements or defining characteristics of "partyness" thus are: 1)cohesive team behavior; 2)orientation toward winning control over the totality of political power exercised by elected officials and those appointed by elected officials; and 3) claiming legitimacy on the basis of electoral success. Organisations with many different structural forms could satisfy these criteria and properly be called parties. On the other hand, organisations that call themselves parties might not. For example, clandestine groups that do not contest elections — even if only because they are legally barred from doing so -- would not qualify as political parties as the term is meant here.[7] More generally, since organisations can vary in the degree to which they satisfy each of these requirements, this implies that "partyness" ought to be regarded as a variable with a range of values, if not necessarily as a continuum, rather than as a dichotomy. In these terms, the British Conservative party is more party-like than the Italian Christian Democracy, while both are more party-like than the American Republicans, who are in turn more party-like than the American Prohibition party.

Party Government

In defining party governmemt, one is again confronted with a choice

between a dichotomy and a range. There has been some tendency to regard party government as a category into which a system either does or does not fit. For example, Mintzel and Schmitt (1981a; see also 1982b) say "Party government is that form of societal conflict regulation in which a plurality of democratically organised political parties play a relatively dominant role both in the socio-political mediation sphere and in the actual process of political decision-making (government sphere)." Similarly, Sjöblom (1981) suggests with a Venn diagram that party government is a class, although he also proposes nested subclasses that might be taken as successively closer approximations of an ideal type.

If one is interested in the causes, consequences, and future of party government, however, this approach is of little help. Leaving aside Mintzel and Schmitt's questionable insistence on democratically organised parties, presumably a reference to their internal arrangements rather than to their commitment to democracy in the wider governmental sphere, if party government is a category, it evidently includes all modern Western democracies with the possible exception of the United States. If this is so, then the concept is of no empirical value, since the corresponding operational variable will have no variance. Moreover, if party government means government through parties and partyness can vary, then party governmentness must be able to take on a range of values as well.

Party government is an abstraction of European parliamentary democracy in the era of mass suffrage. Although most clearly based on academic interpretations of British practice, the party government model is an intellectual construct whose logic is far more coherent than is

the actual operation of any real party governments. In historical terms, the party government model represents the adaptation of the institutions of bourgeois parliamentary democracy (which were adaptations of the institutions of royal government) to democracies with electorates numbering in the millions rather than the thousands. For democratic theory, the party government model makes government accountable to the general public by entrusting it to individuals organised into parties that owe their positions to electoral approbation. More concretely, party government involves at least four conditions.

Firstly, all major governmental decisions must be taken by people chosen in elections conducted along party lines, or by individuals appointed by and responsible to such people. It is not necessary that parties compete on the basis of alternative policy proposals, but whatever policies are made must be made by individuals who owe their authority either directly or indirectly to the electoral success of their parties. Recognising that a permanent bureaucracy is an essential feature of all modern governments, this condition is violated to the extent that bureaucrats exercise independent policy making authority. It is similarly violated whenever rule making power is turned over to individuals who cannot be removed by elected officials[8] or to functional boards whose members owe their positions to their roles in interest groups or the like rather than to party appointment or election.

Secondly, policy must be decided within the governing party, when there is a "monocolor" government, or by negotiation among parties when there is a coalition. Not only must policy be made by elected

officials, a condition met for example by the American Congress, it must also be made along party lines, so that each party may be held collectively accountable for "its" position. This condition is not met by the Congress. Similarly, cross-party negotiations among factions, as occurs in Italy, also violates this condition.

Thirdly, the highest officials (e.g., cabinet ministers and especially the prime minister) must be selected within their parties and be responsible to the people through their parties. Positions in government must flow from support within the party rather than party positions flowing from electoral success. For example, the British practice whereby the leader of the majority party in the House of Commons becomes prime minister is consistent with the party government model while the American usage of declaring the winner of enough primary elections to be nominated for president, or of enough popular votes to be elected president, therefore to be the leader of his party is not. That British party leaders often remain as leaders even after their parties are defeated but are unlikely to survive a substantial intraparty defection even if they formally win the "vote of confidence," while a presidential candidate's "party leadership" can withstand major internal defections but not electoral defeat, is indicative of this distinction. The French case is more complicated, but closer to the party government model than to the American model. Mitterand became the presidential candidate of the Socialist party because he was the party's leader (although clearly his presidential appeal was a condition for his rise to party leadership); he remained party leader even after his defeat in the 1974 election. Giscard was similarly party leader first and president second. His leadership of the larger French right while

he was president, however, was more in the American mold.

Fourthly, party-based leaders must be able effectively to control the bureaucracy and other public or semi-public agencies. Party domination of the elected branches of government must carry with it control over the entire governmental apparatus. Although bureaucrats are never politically irrelevant, the party must be able to coordinate and direct their work effectively.

A number of observations must be made regarding this definition of party government. Firstly, it represents an ideal type, rather like but in contrast to Dahl's (1971) ideal type of polyarchy. As such, it represents an extreme that may be approximated but is neither realised nor realisable in the ultimate sense. It is also a multidimensional concept. Thus a particular system may closely approximate the ideal type in one respect but not in another. For example, while the partyness of American congressional-presidential relations is extremely low in comparison to its British parliamentary-cabinet counterpart, the partyness of the American bureaucracy is higher than that of the British. Similarly, even within a single political system the degree to which many dimensions of the ideal are approximated may vary from one policy area, time, or set of circumstances to another.

Secondly, party government is not a complete description of government or institutions. While perhaps more clearly derived from consideration of adversarial or majoritarian systems in which elections choose between rival and alternating sets of leaders and policies, the basic logic of the model is equally applicable to consociational or coalitional systems.[9] While perhaps more difficult to achieve in

presidential and/or federal systems, party government is logically compatible with these institutional arrangements as well as with parliamentary and unitary systems.

Together, these two observations imply that many different approximations of the party government model are possible. Assuming that a single quantitative measure of party government were devised, it would combine several dimensions with the result that two systems could achieve the same "party government score" while standing quite differently on the individual dimensions. Whether the dimensions that comprise the overall concept of party government are sufficiently coherent that this does not occur, or whether the dimensions of the overall concept must be considered separately, is a question for empirical research.

In the same way, similar "party government scores" might be achieved by countries with very different party systems. Two party competitive systems, systems with alternating coalitions, systems dominated by a single party or coalition with a semipermanent opposition (so long as it is permitted to contest elections freely), and systems with grand coalitions all are potential party governments. Whether similar levels of party government are produced by similar conditions and whether they lead to similar consequences in these differing systems also must be resolved empirically.

Finally, this definition of party government is intended to distinguish party government from other forms of government. It speaks, therefore, to the "partyness of government" as a characteristic of formal institutions and indicates the proportion of formal governmental power exercised in accordance with the party government model. To the

extent that its conditions are met, what formal government there is will be party government. There is no guarantee, however, that there will be any effective formal government at all. While the "authoritative allocation of values" goes on in all societies — even those with no "political" institutions -- the government of the party government model may be more or less relevant to this process.

This observation has two consequences for the definition of party government. Firstly, it means that those conditions which define or promote government in general must be appended to those specifically relating to party government. Secondly, adding these considerations to the definition of party government underlines a distinction between partyness as a characteristic of the formal government apparatus and party governmentness as a social characteristic. For example, in a laissez-faire economy, high partyness of government would still leave parties in a relatively marginal position in the authoritative allocation of economic values. Correspondingly, if the power of government grew while the party politicians' relative ability to control it shrank, parties might become absolutely more important in the overall allocation of values even while the level of partyness of government declined. Party governmentness is then a characteristic of the "herrschaftsorganisation" of the wider society, and indicates the proportion of all social power exercised by parties within the framework of the party government model.

Capacity

Looking at the chronic economic problems of many western countries, or still more at the collapse of democratic regimes in the interwar era,

there is a strong temptation of attribute these difficulties to a lack of capacity on the part of the government or parties. There is an element of truth to this. Assuming that the governments of the contemporary west want to "solve" their economic problems, and assuming that the democratic regimes of Germany, Italy, and Spain "wanted" to survive, their failure to do so certainly indicates a lack of capacity. This, however, is a tautology, not an explanation; if failure is the definer of low capacity, low capacity cannot be the explanation of failure.

Moreover, in many cases it is not clear that failure as defined from outside really is an indicator of low capacity. To listen to the rhetoric of some left wing politicians, one might wonder whether bourgeois parties really do want to reduce unemployment; after all, it keeps wages low and workers docile. Similarly, inflation is beneficial to some groups, at least in the short run. Beyond the debatability of what a solution to many problems is, the cost of a solution in terms of personal or organisational goals may be so high that politicians choose not to solve the problem. In Thurow's (1980: 44) view, for example, Richard Nixon could have stemmed American inflation in 1972 had he persisted with recessionary policies; he believed that to do so, however, would cost him the 1972 election and so he chose to change his policy. Objective failure thus may be the result of lack of will or lack of foresight rather than lack of ability. Finally, some problems may have no solutions. If poverty is relative rather than absolute, then the poor will always be with us.

This suggests that "problem solution capacity" actually consists of four distinct, or semidistinct, elements. The first element is the

capacity to get a specific policy implemented. Taking an example from the field of economic management, if the party leadership decides it wants the central bank's loan rate raised, does it have the ability to get that done. More generally, this element also includes the ability to implement one policy without unintentionally disrupting the implementation of other policies.

The second element of poblem solution capacity is the ability to frame policies that will produce the desired (by the policy maker) results. Conceptually, this and the first element are confused by the fact that many political ends are means to more fundamental ends, which in turn are means, and so forth. Continuing with the economic example, an increase in the bank rate may be a means to reduce the money supply, which is a means to reduce inflation, which is a means to stem capital flight, which is a means to stimulate investment, etc. If the party chooses to reduce the money supply and nothing happens, does this mean that they lacked the capacity to implement a policy or that they lacked the capacity to choose a policy that would produce the desired result? Empirically, however, it is often possible to distinguish perceived means from perceived ends, and to find circumstances in which a party's orders are scrupulously followed without the desired result being achieved.

The third element of problem solution capacity is the ability to choose the "right" aims or policies. This is the most difficult element to deal with because of the ambiguity and unmeasurability of "right." On one hand, the term is often used as a synomym for the policies the writer prefers. This is a danger to be avoided in an objective analysis

of party government. On the other hand, concern with the "right" policies simply pushes the means-ends chain even further along and takes a longer-term view. Can the party identify problems before they become crises? Can it choose policies that avert crises in the future? In the economic example, can the party find a balance among economic growth, inflation, unemployment, and conservation of resources that is viable in the long run?[10]

The final element of problem solution capacity is will. Given that a party could identify correct long term goals, could formulate policies that would achieve those goals, and could get those policies implemented, does it do so? Is the party so positioned and so structured that its leaders are prepared to expend the resources and bear the costs involved in formulating and implementing policies?

The economic examples suggest that capacity involves the power to alter social reality, for example to solve the problem of inflation by reducing the inflation rate. There is another sense of capacity that must be remembered, the ability to resolve or defuse problems by altering perceptions rather than situations, in this case to get people to see a higher inflation rate as acceptable or to lower their level of concern. The same elements are relevant to this sense of capacity as well.

Survivability

There are three ways to conceive of the survivability of a system of party government. The first concerns the durability of the current party system and especially the continued dominance of those parties most regularly in office. On the surface, this may be the least interesting. No party system can survive forever in a dynamic society.

Even if the party labels remain the same and there is continuity of organisation, the issues raised by the parties, the social groups allied with each party, and the party leaders will all change. Realignments, the rise of new parties and the collapse of old parties all may occur without causing more than cosmetic changes to the society's system of governance. On the other hand, the survival of the current party system is likely to be of great importance to those owing their positions to it.

The second aspect of survivability of party government relates to the continued adherence of political actors to the party government strategy. The alternative would be a voluntary abandonment of this strategy and thus the supersession of party government by some other form[11]. This could come about if the combination of goals and circumstances that led originally to the establishment of party government were to change. For example, exogenous changes such as the rise of television or strengthened interest group systems might encourage even those who have gained power through party to adopt other strategies and certainly would alter the attractiveness of alternative avenues of influence for succeeding generations of political activists. The long run effect would be to change the balance of political forces to the detriment of party government. Moreover, the interplay of short term and long term goals could lead those in power under a party government model to make choices that ultimately undermine that very system from within. The creation of nonparty independent boards such as the British Electricity Board or the American Federal Reserve Board illustrate this possibility.

Supersession, as these examples suggest, would be an evolutionary process resulting from gradual changes and the interplay of many individual decisions over a period of time. Since party government is more a matter of interrelationships among individuals than it is of institutions, it is likely that many of the structures of party government -- cabinets, partisan elections, and the parties themselves -- would survive a process of supersession, just as the "dignified" parts of the 19th century English constitution had survived their supersession by the "efficient" parts (Bagehot, 1963). Indeed, the persistence of the old institutions might aid in legitimising the new regime. The actual level of party government would decline over time until ultimately one discovered that it had gone. While we have no examples of party governments being fully superseded by some other form, one can look for examples of decline in party government.

The third aspect of survivability is avoidance of precipitate collapse or what Smith calls rupture. In this case, the institutions of the old party government regime disappear. The agents of the collapse may be external, as in a coup or revolution, or they may be internal, with those currently in office deciding to restructure the government themselves. Presumably, rupture could in the abrupt replacement of one variety of party government by another, as the replacement of the Fourth French Republic by the Fifth ultimately did. It is clear, however, that De Gaulle's intention was to establish a democratic, but nonparty government, regime. The early Fifth Republic in fact would be scored low in party governmentness.

Democracy

Much of the concern for the future of party government stems from the close connection of this model with ideas about democracy. Indeed, representative democracy has been defined by some in such a way as to make party government logically necessary for its attainment. This is not the place for a full consideration of the meaning of democracy, but since the question of whether party government is a necessary condition for democratic or nonauthoritarian government in mass societies so colours discussion of its future, this question must be addressed.

The party government model presumes a relatively centralised decision-making process in which a single agency, be it a parliament, a president, or a cabinet exercises supreme control over the full range of government activities. The problem is to democratise that government. In the party government conception, the fundamental democratic principle is majority rule. Because a majority has given their votes to the party or coalition of parties in power and can be said collectively to control them, either prospectively or retrospectively, those politicians are entitled to exercise all the power of the state. Thus, where formal institutions are not centralised in this way, the model assigns to parties the function of making them operate in practice as if they were so organised.

The party government model implicitly assumes the possibility of forming majority coalitions, either within a single party or among a limited number of parties, that are able to agree on a wide range of issues. In its simplest form, the party government model must assume not only that there are two sides to every question (Duverger, 1959), but that there are exactly two significant complexes of positions each represented by one of exactly two parties, one of which is thus

guaranteed a majority. Variations based on coalitions relax this assumption, but the notion that political conflict should be contained in the competition of relatively few, cohesive, parties still carries with it the expectation that society will be similarly divided into relatively few cohesive groups, each with its own complex of policy positions or interests. The archetypical example of this is working class solidarity in the socialist tradition of class based politics, but farmers' parties, or parties of religious subcultures could be equally consistent with it.

Laid out like this, it is clear that there are alternative conceptions of democracy imaginable. Two may be mentioned as examples. One is a kind of neocorporatism exemplified by Heisler's (1974) "European polity model." In contrast to the party government model's assumption of centralised decision-making, this model envisions functionally segmented authority. The fundamental value is compromise and the achievement of consensual decisions among those most directly affected by a particular policy, rather than decision by a majority of all citizens. The people are represented in the decision-making bodies of this system, but not primarily in their capacity as citizens. Instead, the emphasis is on representation of affected interests. In Heisler's model, functional boards coexist with a parliamentary system, but as the corporatist bodies gain in influence, the model quite naturally begins to assign primacy to interest groups rather than to parties as avenues of popular participation in the governing process.

The other alternative is pluralist democracy as elaborated by Dahl(1956) among others and approximated by government in the United

States. Emphasis is shifted from majority rule to the protection of minorities. This is achieved in part through the incoherence of the parties. Instead of each party representing a distinctive social or ideological constituency, the parties overlap so that no party can afford to offend any group. In place of stable majorities, shifting coalitions that often cut across party lines decide succeeding issues. In terms of social structure, this model assumes cross-cutting cleavages rather than coherent groups.

Whether these, or other possible systems, would have the necessary capacity to resolve social problems, whether they could survive, and whether they could remain nonauthoritarian are open questions, but the same is true of party government.

Relationships and Hypotheses

As laid out above, party government is less a category than it is a strategy which might be pursued within the category of democratic government. Consequently, the first questions that must be addressed are: 1) under what circumstances would individuals seeking control of government adopt the party government strategy? and 2) what conditions relate to their likelihood of success? A second set of questions then relates the level of party government to the concepts of capacity and survivability: 3) what are the conditions for capacity and survivability? and 4) does the model of party government have any built-in characteristics that relate to capacity or survivability? Naturally, complete answers to these questions are impossible here. The purpose of this section is simply to outline a number of theoretical relationships and

to sketch several hypotheses that might be tested in later research.

Conditions for Party Government

Political parties were organised to mobilise mass support. They are not the only way in which mass support may be mobilised and channeled. Interest groups, in fact, predate political parties and were used to mobilise support to influence parliamentary and monarchic governments. With increases in education and leisure time and with the growing complexity of societies, the number and range of interest groups has mushroomed. In corporatist or polyarchal models of government, these structures are far more important than are parties. Further, the mass media, especially television, increasingly are able to arouse the public, either on behalf of politicians, who thus no longer need rely on party as their primary channel of communication with the public, or on behalf of other interests, including their own. Moreover, important though it may be, mass support is not the only important political resource. As the complexity of the problems with which the government deals increases, so too does the value of technical expertise. As the need for voluntary compliance and cooperation increases, so too does the value of being able to secure or withhold that compliance. Political parties may be able to mobilise these resources, but they may not. As a consequence, party is a political tool whose relative effectiveness and attractiveness to elites may vary.

To account for the behavior of politicians (and others) requires understanding of their goals so that the costs and benefits of various actions in terms of those goals may be assessed. The problem of goals may be dealt with in either, or a combination, or two ways. They may be

ascertained empirically. This appears most desirable, but actually involves several serious difficulties. To infer goals from behavior leads immediately to a problem of circularity; if behavior is the operational indicator of goals, then hypotheses explaining behavior on the basis of goals are nonfalsifiable. While direct questioning about goals avoids this problem, the practical problems of obtaining frank responses coupled with the impossibility of interviewing those who have passed from the scene render this strategy of questionable value as well. Public pronouncements such as speeches and party manifestos, while ostensible statements of goals, are prepared for strategic as well as informative purposes. Moreover, they frequently relate only to one variety of goal, those concerning public policy. Nonetheless, this kind of data, if interpreted with caution, does provide some insight into goals.

The other approach to goals is to stipulate them by assumption. The strategy then is to reason out what a rational actor pursuing the assumed goals would do, compare actual behavior to the deduced hypotheses, and to the degree that they coincide interpret this as evidence supporting both the general theory and the assumption about goals.

For professional politicians, the most common assumption has been that they "are interested in getting reelected -- indeed, in their role here as abstractions, interested in nothing else" (Mayhew, 1974: 13). While an obvious oversimplification, this assumption has been defended on three grounds. The first is the importance of the desire to be reelected as the mechanism on which democratic theory relies to make office holders accountable to the general public. Politicians with no desire to be reelected would have no necessary incentive to worry about

the needs or desires of their constituents. Secondly, whatever the other goals of politicians, reelection is an instrument to their realisation. To paraphrase one maxim, if winning isn't everything, losing isn't anything. Finally, the assumption that politicians are single minded seekers of reelection is defended on the ground that it works. A significant range of real world behavior can be explained in this way.

An alternative approach is to assume the primacy of policy commitments over office. In this formulation, office has purely instrumental value; rational politicians will not compromise their beliefs to win or retain office since doing so destroys the value of victory. There is certainly some truth to this position. Aside from the individual who has given up office for a principle, the continued existence of parties with no likelihood of ever participating in government or even winning a seat[12] and the fervor with which some parties espouse positions they know to be costly electorally imply that there must be some motivation beside office seeking. At the same time, for every "profile in courage," there are corresponding "apologetic statesmen of a compromising kind" prepared to endure anything in order to retain office.[13]

A more realistic view of parties and politicians requires that three types of goals be considered. The first are policy goals. Clearly one reason why people engage in political activity is that they want to achieve or defeat certain social, economic, or political changes. Burke's very definition of party, "a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some principle in which they are all agreed" (1839: v. I, 425-26) reflects

the importance of this motivation. While politicians and parties differ with regard to the specificity of their policy goals, the degree to which they perceive them to be interconnected (ideological) or isolated, the range of compromise they are prepared to accept, and the overall importance they ascribe to policy, it would be difficult to find anyone engaged in political activity who was completely indifferent to policy. On the other hand, to assume that all members of a particular party must be agreed on anything but the vaguest of principles is to ignore the tremendous differences within such parties as the American Democrats, the Japanese Liberal Democrats, or the Italian Christian Democrats.

A second set of goals is organisational. Examples include maintaining party unity, increasing the size of the party's membership, or securing some subsidy or competitive advantage. To the extent that party is purely instrumental, these goals are instrumental as well. The phenomenon of "party loyalty" and the agonising of politicians before they desert a party of which they have been long time members, however, suggest that party may become an end in itself, a valued association to be defended even at the expense of other goals. Additionally, since the expected long term instrumental value of party may outweigh short term costs to other values, this category of goal must be considered.

Finally, there are personal goals. Politicians are people as well as public figures. While it may make little sense to assume that parties as organisations seek office for its own sake, for an individual the social position, power, salary, or other perquisites that are part of public office may be an ultimate, if rarely the ultimate, goal. Enough has been written about the corrupting influence of office to underscore the importance of such personal goals for leading

politicians, and those who aspire to become leading politicians.

Although this discussion has been in terms largely of professional politicians, the same types of goals may be ascribed to party members, supporters, and voters. Left wing policy demands that currently threaten the existence of the British Labour party are based largely in the rank and file and middle level elites. The sacking of leading MPs for the crime of excessive loyalty to the leader indicates a feeling that electoral victory without ideological purity is not worth winning. At other times, constituency parties have behaved as though nothing were so important as party loyalty, even in the face of abrupt about turns in policy (Ranney, 1965: 281). Similarly, personal goals may be important at all levels of party. Some party members may be attracted primarily by a desire to contribute to party victory as a way of influencing policy for the public good or because they value victory by "their" party in the same way that they value victory by "their" football team, but others may be attracted by the hope of special treatment or patronage from the government, because a party job is preferable to unemployment or intrinsically attractive, or simply for a social outlet (Wilson, 1962). While my concern is primarily with party leaders, they must take account of the motivations of their followers if they are to be effective.

The interrelationships among these goals may be quite complex. Any of them may be instrumental for the achievement of others. Office or party organisation may be valued because they contribute to the opportunity to control policy, but policy may be manipulated so as to retain office or in the interest of party unity. Similarly, a strong organisa-

tion may make the personal rewards of leadership more appealing and realisable, but the achievement of high status may be used to bolster the party organisation. Conversely, no single strategy is likely to be best for achieving all three types of goals simultaneously (Sjöblom, 1968: 158-82). Compromises with other parties required to achieve office or to influence public policy may undermine the loyalty of party activists and thus weaken the party, as the Italian Communists recently have found, but ideological purity may be maintained only by remaining without office or influence. The internal compromises required to maintain party unity or to advance one's personal career may involve sacrificing policy preferences.

Although under some circumstances rational individuals may decide that a party strategy is the best way to achieve their goals, that strategy will certainly involve costs. Party involves compromise, co-operation, and discipline, and those occasionally mean not doing what one otherwise would like to do. Although his limits of tolerance will vary according to the relative value placed on compensatory goals, unless the party is agreed totally on everything, a party politician occasionally will be compelled by party loyalty to support policies that personally he opposes. A party oriented voter occasionally will have to vote for his party's candidate, even though he finds a candidate of another party to be more attractive personally. In a party government, bureaucrats occasionally will have to be silent and support policies that they think are ill-advised. The problem of explaining party government is to find combinations of circumstances and goals under which people will be willing to bear these costs.

In speculating about these conditions, one runs a great risk of

circularity. The strongest conditioning factor for party government at the present is to have had party government in the past. Political arrangements have a natural inertia. The role models for aspiring politicians, and thus the expectations on which they base their judgments, are the behavior patterns of their predecessors. Even when there are major structural changes, behavior is likely to adjust slowly. As Bagehot (1963: 268) observed about so momentous a change as the Reform Act of 1832, "A new Constitution does not produce its full effect as long as all its subjects were reared under an old Constitution, as long as its statesmen were trained by that old Constitution." Change will be even slower without major upheavals.

Further, the defining characteristics of party government are conditioning factors for its continuance. If party dominates the policy making process, then those seeking to influence policy must work through parties. If the only route to office is through partisan election, then those seeking office must become party men. Moreover, many other factors that may provide incentives for party government-like behavior are themselves consequences of party government. Examples include party control over interest articulation and political communication, the existence of structural biases favoring partisan candidates over independents, or wide spread party identification in the mass public. Nonetheless, if some element of this apparently homeostatic pattern of mutual causation and reinforcement were to be modified by an exogenous force, one would expect changes throughout, and ultimately a change in the system's propensity toward party government. What factors ought one to expect to determine the level of party government?

Presidential or parliamentary government -- Party government is more likely in parliamentary systems because party is more useful to political leaders in such systems. A parliamentary cabinet needs a continuous majority to remain in office; even if a pattern of shifting alliances might allow a prime minister to remain in office with a different majority on each vote, his ministry would be changing constantly. Party is a device by means of which stable majorities may be achieved, whether office is seen as an instrumental or as an ultimate value. Party is also useful for backbench MPs. For those interested in office, it provides a career ladder; for those interested in policy, party provides a means of influencing the ministry, whose continuous dependence on party support forces them to take account of backbench opinion even if electoral expediency calls for another course.

Presidential government, on the other hand, both makes personalism more likely and entails two rival arenas for decision-making. While the latter problem may be minimised by institutionalising executive dominance, as in Fifth Republic France, the former is thereby heightened. A president, with the resources of the state at his command, the status and visibility of head of state and head of government, and the security of a fixed term is likely to think of himself as separate from and independent of his party. Presidents, in seeing themselves personally to have been entrusted with administration of the state tend to appoint officials with weak or no party ties to a greater extent than do prime ministers. The officials so appointed owe their positions far more clearly to the president than to their parties. All this weakens party government (cf. Lijphart, 1977: 28-29, 210-16).

Two factors may contribute to a partial overcoming of the anti-

party bias of presidential systems. The first is frequent partisan reelection campaigns; the seven year term of the French president, for example, allows the incumbent so to overshadow his party that they are left with little alternative but to be subservient to him. The second is party control over nomination and renomination. Party government can coexist with a presidential system if only committed party men can become president or if party support is required for reelection. A system in which the president is chosen by a partisan electoral college like that of Finland would be more likely to have party government than one in which the president effectively is elected directly, as in the United States or France.

Integration and centralisation -- The essence of party government is that what appears to the public as a single entity, the political party, is in coordinated control of the entire government. While this is possible in a decentralised state, with a tightly centralised party organisation coordinating disparate branches of government, it is easier if the institutions of government are themselves centralised. Moreover, decentralised government also makes centralisation of the party more difficult to maintain (Eldersveld, 1964; Duverger, 1959: 55-56).

This is especially so if the basis of decentralisation is geographic. In this case, implementation of policies initiated at one level may depend on cooperation of officials at another level where government has a different partisan complexion. Responsibility is naturally obscured, and the parties have an incentive to obscure it further, those in control at each level attempting to claim credit for successful or popular policies while blaming those in control at the

other level for the rest. Moreover, if subnational governments are too powerful, the corresponding level of party organisation may supplant the national party as the primary focus of loyalty. If there are important regional differences in culture or interest, this can seriously undermine the coherence of the national parties and party system. The clearest examples of these problems are the distinction between presidential and congressional parties or between northern and southern Democrats in the United States (Burns, 1963) but Swiss parties show evidence of this as well (Katz, 1981; Kerr, 1974).

Electoral system -- Various aspects of the electoral system should have an impact on the level and nature of party government. Probably the most significant for party unity is the presence or absence of some form of intraparty electoral choice. In some systems, voters can choose only parties; the choice of the particular individuals who will be elected if their parties are victorious is an internal party decision. In other systems, however, voters either can influence or entirely determine the choice of person as well as of party (Katz, forthcoming). Where a candidate must compete with other candidates of his own party, support of and by the party is unlikely to be adequate for election. Instead, the candidate is forced to develop his own base of support. This undermines party cohesion in two ways. Firstly, it gives the successful candidate an independent base; not owing his election only to the party, he has less reason to be loyal to it. Secondly, in building support for the intraparty competition, the candidate will have made compromises, incurred debts, and developed loyalties different from those of his copartisans. Once in office, these candidates find party unity harder to maintain, especially if the intraparty competition

involved questions of policy in addition to personalities (Katz, 1980).

Proportional representation (PR) should be more conducive to party government than are single member majority or plurality systems. PR systems' list orientation forces candidates to campaign and voters to think in partisan rather than personal terms. It also encourages a uniform national party system by raising the local threshold for representation (Rae, 1971) -- thus discouraging purely local parties -- while also encouraging parties that present candidates anywhere to present them everywhere. That candidates of a party in all areas of the country face the same multiple competitors should encourage them to take the same, ideological, positions, making party unity easier to maintain. On the other hand, PR also encourages party fragmentation by lowering the costs of party schisms. The insipient threat of schism may be manifested in factionalism. In any case, fragmentation will make coalition government more likely.

Other things being equal, the more different kinds of elected officials there are, the weaker party government is likely to be. In particular, election of more than one official at the national level (e.g., a president and a prime minister) is likely to weaken party government by multiplying the number of individuals with personal claims to speak for the party. On the other hand, increasing the number of partisan appointed officials makes party government more likely. As government has grown larger and more complex, it has required more people to control and coordinate it. Without adequate loyal personnel, a party government nominally in power has no defense against foot dragging bureaucrats and little hope of keeping fully informed of intra-

governmental happenings. Similarly, policy making occurs at many points, requiring a large number of partisans in office if the party is to participate in the making of most policies, let alone if it is to make them itself (Rose, 1969).

Size of the public sector -- While enlargement of the public sector may increase the party governmentness of society, it is likely to decrease the partyness of government. Firstly, a large public sector makes the ruling party more dependent on experts. Often these will be bureaucrats or representatives of affected interests rather than party people. Moreover, even those who are employees of the party are likely to have divided loyalties, on one hand to the party but on the other to their professional peer group. Secondly, the larger the sphere of government activity, the more difficult will be the problem of coordination and the greater the degree of bureaucratic uncontrollability. Thirdly, expansion of government gives more groups a greater stake in politics, encouraging greater activity and involvement, but many of these groups are rivals for party. Fourthly, as more of the economy comes under public control, the need for stability, the party's desire to evade responsibility if things go wrong, and the party's fear of being totally excluded should they lose the next election all grow. This has led to the creation of nonpartisan and multipartisan boards to control, for example, banking, nationalised industries, and mass communication. Once such boards are created, however, significant areas of policy leave direct party control and the problems of coordination of public policy increase.

Private government -- Individuals naturally try to avoid responsibility for unsuccessful policies. To maintain the collective

responsibility that is the hallmark of party government is easier if the public is denied access to intraparty decision-making. Unable to attribute blame to any particular individual or faction, the voters are encouraged to reward or punish the party as a whole. This, in turn, gives each member of the party a stake in the success of its policies, even if he opposed them initially.

Private government also encourages party unity by making compromise among party leaders more possible. All parties are coalitions, and party leaders frequently owe their positions to the particular support of a subgroup within the party, be it based on personal loyalties, policy preferences, or organisational ties. Not faced with the need to forge agreement themselves, those supporters may not be sympathetic to the accommodations necessary to achieve unity, forcing the leader into the untenable position of alienating his supporters if he compromises, but losing his effectiveness if he does not.

Input, representation, and communication -- When party is the primary channel for public participation, demand articulation and aggregation, and communication from leaders to followers, party government will be stronger. Where other structures, e.g., mass media and interest groups, share in performing these functions, party control over politics will be weaker. In particular, if the party is sufficiently in control of communication efectively to control the political agenda, party government will be stronger. If nonparty agencies are able to set public priorities, however, the position of the parties will be weaker.

Bureaucratic anonymity -- Bureaucrats are both potential rivals for party politicians and potential scapegoats for their failures. Both these possibilities undermine party government, but both can be minimised by an expectation of bureaucratic anonymity. Party government is furthered when politicians cannot avoid responsibility by blaming policies on the bureaucracy and bureaucrats are more likely to implement policies they personally oppose if they know they will not suffer for good faith efforts to implement bad policies. Moreover, party government is undermined whenever bureaucrats can appeal around their political masters directly to the public or to a powerful interest group clientele.

Social segmentation -- Where each party represents a clearly discernable interest, segment, class, or viewpoint within society, party unity will be easier to maintain, the distinction between parties will be clearer, and party government will be more likely. Cross-cutting cleavages and overlapping party constituencies will make interparty cooperation, and intraparty dissension, more likely, thus decreasing the level of party government.

Where society is divided into relatively few groups, each of which has a relatively coherent set of views spanning the range of public issues, a relatively small number of parties should be able adequately to represent those views. Cross-cutting cleavages force the leaders of each party to ignore many issues, consideration of which would threaten their party's unity. One consequence of this is likely to be increased importance for interest groups that represent those concerns.

As the last several conditions mentioned indicate, party government depends not only on party politicians but also on the behavior of actors for whom the pattern of goals and structure of incentives may be quite different. While a full treatment of this problem is beyond the scope of a single paper, three potentially rival power wielders should be discussed briefly, both for illustrative purposes and because of their importance.

Bureaucracy -- The first of these is the bureaucracy. Especially in Britain, there was once a tendency to assume the civil service to be apolitical (e.g., Morrison, 1964: 52, 328-31). As an ideal type, the model of bureaucracy assumes not only that bureaucrats are neutral with regard to the policy questions of the day, but also that they do not have personal goals that might conflict with their public responsibilities. Both these assumptions are false. Bureaucrats have a vested interest in established routines and relationships, and in the policies associated with them. There often develops an agreed "civil service" view of how things ought to be done. While these preferences may not be partisan in a strict sense, they represent a tremendous barrier to a party wishing to innovate. Bureaucrats also have an interest in converting their minister from a member of a party team into a spokesman for their department (Crossman, 1972: 63-65). The bureaucrat's private career interest gives him an incentive to defend his program and budget, often by building support for them outside the government in the form of a clientele. But as in all patron-client relationships, the patron acquires obligations as well as support. Clientelism gives bureaucrats both the opportunity and often the neeed

to obstruct party policies (Dumont, 1972).

Interest groups -- The second set of potential rivals for party government is interest groups. In the party government model, groups should pursue their interests through parties, either by offering and withholding electoral support or by becoming affiliated with or penetrating a party.[14] The former strategy is likely to be effective if the group's support can make an appreciable difference and if it can be withheld credibly. The latter is likely to be pursued only if one party is dominant; the price of influence through one party is lack of influence when that party is out of office.

If neither of these conditions is met, and especially if the group's interests are relatively narrow, a clientelistic relationship with the bureaucracy is likely to be most productive. The administrative problems of bureaucrats are greatly reduced if they can establish a working relationship with the representatives of the interest affected by their agency. The group, in return, is guaranteed sympathetic access to those in charge of the policies affecting them. Over time, the bureaucrats come to depend on their clients for political support and administrative assistance. The group's leadership tends to be coopted to a quasi-administrative perspective. As the groups leaders and bureaucrats move together, this kind of relationship can lead to party politicians being presented with faits accomplis -- policies agreed by the bureaucracy and the affected interests and not readily subject to change.

A related alternative to a clientelistic strategy is to press for corporatist decision-making. Again, the interest group gains direct access to and participation in the decision process and the bureaucracy

gains a smoothly administerable program. Establishment of corporatist bodies may be attractive for parties as well as a way of defusing opposition and coopting critics. Although this may be an effective short term strategy for the particular parties in power, in the longer term party government is weakened as expressions of political interest are no longer channeled exclusively through party. Effective administration requires strong and well-articulated interest groups with which party and bureaucracy may deal, but these then become rival sources of power.

Television -- Finally, the third rival that requires mention is television journalism. This has assumed many of the functions -- oversight, criticism, raising of issues -- traditionally ascribed to the opposition. But unlike party oppositions, television is both permanently in opposition, and thus never called upon to do better, and apparently disinterested, and thus credible (Crozier, 1975: 92; Smith, 1979).

Although television journalists may have particular policy views they would like to advance, their greatest impact on the problem of party government comes from their pursuit of professional goals (Altheide, 1974). Television has tended to personalise politics, increasing the visibility of a few party leaders while diminishing the salience of party. Investigative reporting has decreased the anonymity of bureaucrats and the privacy of government. In the name of objectivity, television has provided a channel for bureaucrats, interest groups, and dissident politicians to mobilise support without the aid of party. In conformance with the professional norm that "good news is no

news," television has undermined public confidence in public institutions, including parties (Robinson, 1976). The immediacy of television news has forced party leaders to give more weight to short term results, to their personal images, and to goals relating to maintenance of their positions at the expense both of governing and of more general organisational goals.

This is not to suggest that television journalists have undermined party government intentionally. Rather, their pursuit of their own goals has an impact on the behavioral incentives of others to the detriment of party government.

Survivability

For the social theorist interested in the problem of party government, primary interest in survivability concerns the persistence of party government as a form of herrschaftsorganisation. This persistence depends, however, on the aggregate decisions and behavior of individuals for whom the immediate concern is far more likely to be the survivability of their own parties. Regardless of whether office and party strength are instrumental or ultimate goals, they can hardly be ignored by politicians seeking to achieve anything through party government.

Survival of a party requires the conjunction of two interrelated conditions. First, the supporters and especially the activists and second level leaders of the party must be sufficiently satisfied that they continue to work for it, and in particular that they do not exercise, either singly or collectively, the exit option (Hirschmann,

1970). How easy this will be depends both on the goals of those individuals and on circumstances.

One way for party leaders to minimise the risk of exit is to make use of voice relatively more attractive, that is by being responsive to the demands of their followers. This may involve substantial costs to the leaders, however. It reduces their autonomy, and perhaps also the value of party leadership. They may resist for this reason alone. The policy demands of party activists may also be counterproductive for leaders seeking to win elections or enter coalition governments. In single member plurality electoral systems, for example, it is well known that, other things being equal, parties taking moderate positions are more likely to win. The supporters of a single party, however, representing only one half of the political spectrum (assuming a two party system) will prefer policies more extreme than those supported by the average voter. The response that Robertson (1976) suggests for party leaders is to satisfy their followers when an election is "unwinnable" or "unlosable," and to satisfy the voters when the election's outcome is in doubt. This is only possible to the extent that followers will allow. If ideological purity is excessively important to a party's supporters, its leaders may have no alternative but to take electorally disadvantageous positions and suffer the consequences at the polls. In general, if the party's followers can be induced to accept symbolic rewards, especially such as the value of party loyalty, the survivability of the party is increased.

Similar observations are relevant to professional activists and MPs. Where policy is important but there are deep disagreements within the party, unity is harder to maintain; where office is important and

can best be achieved through unity, it is easier to maintain. For example, discipline within British parties increases as the size of the government's majority decreases, while policy differences within the out-of-office Labour movement have brought the party to the verge of collapse. On the continent, the Italian Christian Democrats appear willing to go to any lengths to remain united so long as unity guarantees office (DiPalma, 1977). Where the perceived costs of exit are low, unity will be harder to maintain; where leaving the party is tantamount to retiring from politics, compromises will be more likely. This applies to party leadership as well. If defections are likely to cause loss of office, leaders are far more likely to defer to their followers (Axelrod, 1970).

Both leaders and followers are likely to find party unity easier to achieve when they perceive it to be in their own interests. The other condition for the continuance of a party system, continued electoral support, is related to this. It is far easier to find reasons for leaving a party whose electoral support is eroding than one whose electoral stock is rising. This works the other way as well; a united party is more likely to do well at the ballot box. More importantly, however, electoral success is related to perceived performance in office -- the state of the economy, prospects for war and peace, and the like. The problem is that these conditions may not be compatible. Thus one consequence of the DC's unwillingness to risk party unity by taking firm action has been continually eroding electoral support. From the other perspective, one problem for those who want to pursue conservative economic policies is to produce the expected long term revival before

the short term electoral consequences of unemployment and retrenched social services cause their parties to desert them or to collapse.

The second sense of survival relates to the continued adherence of those in power under a party government to its norms, nonsurvival in this sense relating to a gradual evolution to some other power arrangement. Party government should survive in this sense so long as the structure of incentives that led individuals to adopt that strategy remains in place. To the extent that this simply involves projecting the conditions for party government into the future, little further elaboration is required here. One point, however, does need to be made. Although party government involves costs for some people, once a system of party government is established, those who come to the top have a vested interest in its continuation, as well as in the continuation of their own parties. At the same time, many of the conditions of party government are subject to conscious manipulation. Thus barriers may be erected against those who attempt to pursue a nonparty strategy. The discrimination of most electoral systems and legislative committee assignment processes against independents and adherents of small or new parties are two examples.

This is not to deny the possibility of changes that would lead to the supersession of party government by some alternative form. As suggested above, technological, social, organisational, or political innovations may create new possibilities or alter the relative attractiveness of old ones. Some of these changes, such as the creation of specialist or corporatist boards, may be brought about deliberately by party leaders as short run responses to political problems. Nonetheless, a thought-out choice on the part of party politicians to

abandon an established system of party government seems unlikely.

If party government is a system from which evolution through gradual abandonment is unlikely, the third aspect of survivability -- avoidance of precipitate collapse -- becomes that much more relevant. For a political system to avoid collapse, it must maintain an adequate level of support. While this is hard to specify, and certainly varies with load and the visibility of alternatives, some level of positive support coupled at least with general acquiesence is necessary for a free government to survive. How is that support maintained, and can party government maintain it?

Support is correlated with performance relative to expectations. Assuming that a system currently has adequate support, its support could become inadequate as a result of any of three processes. Firstly, the difficulty of the problems confronting the government might increase. Some such increases in load may be imposed from outside the political system. For example, in recent times, the formation of the OPEC cartel and resulting dramatic increase in the price of oil has made the problem of economic management objectively more difficult. Similar increases in the objective difficulty of governing have accompanied economic depressions, failed crops, and natural disasters. Other increases in load result from the politicisation of previously nonpolitical problems (Sjöblom, 1982). In part, this is a problem of expectations, which will be discussed below -- natural disasters only pose a threat to the government if there is an expectation that government ought to deal with their consequences. This is a clear example of the political importance of being able to control the definition of the political. On the other

hand, increases in the range of politicised problems also make governing generally more difficult.

Secondly, the capacity of the system could decline. While ability to manage problems is related to the difficulty of the problems to be managed -- it is unlikely that there was anything the Weimar Republic could have done to avoid dissatisfaction during a world-wide depression -- equally some governments are better able than others to cope with problems of comparable difficulty. Conditions relating to capacity will be discussed in the next section.

The third situation that may endanger a system of party government is escalating expectations, either that the government will do more things than currently or that it will do those things that it is currently doing better. Expectations arise from three processes. The first is extrapolation from the past. This source of expectations would be of little concern if apparently good performance necessarily indicated real capacity; in this case there would be every reason to expect performance to continue. If, however, apparently good performance were simply the result of fortuitous circumstances, the system could well prove unequal to the challenge when circumstances become less favorable. This may be precisely the situation in which the western democracies currently find themselves; having taken credit for the economic boom of the 1960s, they must now pay the price of unfulfilled expectations of continued rapid growth in the late 1970s and 1980s. And as the preceding sentence implies, this is a danger that is exacerbated by the electoral incentive for parties in power to claim personal or partisan credit for good times, whether they were responsible or not.

A second source of expectations is promises. In their campaigns, candidates try to convince voters that good things will result from their election. The danger is that expectations will be raised beyond the ability of the victorious party to perform. In several places Sartori (1966; 1976: 137-76) talks about the irresponsible opposition of extreme parties permanently excluded from office in systems of polarised pluralism. Knowing that they will never be called upon to deliver, they engage in reckless outbidding, constantly promising more and more. In fact, this phenomenon is limited neither to extreme parties nor to systems of polarised pluralism. Although unfulfilled promises may ultimately undermine a party's credibility, in the short run, optimistic promises are beneficial; witness the glowing economic forecasts of governments in power.[15] Especially for a party currently out of office, the temptation to promise more than it can deliver so as to win office can be very powerful. But this can only lead to disenchantment with the entire party system, or more generally with the whole idea of parties and party government.

Rising expectations may also be created by nonparty groups as a means of pressuring the government. By convincing a segment of the public that the government can and should do some particular thing, they increase the cost to the party in power of not doing it. Group leaders may well recognise these demands as strategic and be happy to settle for far less; that their followers will be equally realistic is doubtful.

Although one tends to think primarily of support from the public or from interest groups outside the political branches of government -- interest groups and the military for example -- support for the system

by those who operate it is at least as important. A problem analogous to a revolution of rising expectations in the mass public is the danger that politicians themselves may develop unrealistic expectations, or alternatively that the system will tend to promote politicians whose expectations are already unrealistic. The frustration that they experience when their expectations meet the reality of limited power can also have a destabilising influence.

Inadequate support, whether resulting from absolute incapacity to deal with social problems or simply from unrealisable expectations makes a political system extremely vulnerable. Whether it actually collapses depends on the availability of an alternative and the presence of a precipitating crisis.

This discussion can be related to the four-category typology proposed by Gordon Smith (1981; 1982). This typology is derived from the intersection of two dichotomies, one based on the survival of party government and the other on adaptability. The four resulting types are defined in Table 1. Although not identical, Smith's typology fits very closely with my own. The supersession category corresponds to my second sense of non-survival -- an evolution away from party government brought about by politicians ceasing to follow the party government strategy. The rupture category relates to my third sense of non-survival -- regime suicide or revolution. In this application of Smith's categories, immobilism is the situation in which support is inadequate, but no catalytic crisis has occurred. This highlights the significance of my emphasis on support as a function both of capacity (adaptability) and of expectations.

The discussion above coupled with this typology suggests three

routes by which party government might disappear. One would be movement directly from high association to supersession. Societal changes could lead politicians to abandon party government without any apparent loss in government efficiency or legitimacy. In this case, party government would adapt itself out of existence, much as the British aristocracy adapted itself to the social changes of the 18th and 19th centuries; while the institutions might remain, their significance would be thoroughly altered. The second and third routes both run through the immobilism category. Party politicians are unable or unwilling to adapt to social changes or to meet expectations. They may ultimately recognise the situation and adapt. Depending on the adaptation, this could lead to supersession (the second route) or back to high association. The third route would result if the governing elite failed to adapt. In this case, a crisis ultimately would topple the entire system. There is no ground to expect a possible direct movement from high association to rupture unless it were imposed from outside.

The particular relevance of the first meaning of survival arises when one considers why politicians would fail to adapt. Historically, adaptation of a party system has usually meant the replacement of one set of dominant parties or leaders by another. Thus, although the long term consequences of nonadaptation may be system collapse, and total ruin for all concerned, the short term consequence of adaptation may be very high costs for those who actually make the necessary decisions. They may prefer to let tomorrow take care of itself. Again Italy provides an apt example. So long as the DC stays together and Italian democracy survives, any Italian government will be dominated by the DC.

The DC can only stay together at the price of nonadaptation, that is by side-stepping the need to address fundamental problems. Each time they do this, however, the future of Italian democracy becomes more precarious (Battaglia, 1979).

Capacity

A party that was totally capable both at governing and at managing expectations and desires would never lose office. No party is totally capable. As suggested in the last section, there are forces inherent in the party government model militating against the effective management of expectations. There are also forces inherent in party government that limit its problem solution capacity.

As outlined above, problem solution capacity requires talent in a variety of fields and of a variety of types, cooperation especially from the bureaucracy, and will. Looking first at talent, party government involves turning over power to the winners of elections. The skills and talents required for electoral success, however, are very different from those required for policy formulation and implementation (Cronin, 1980: 19-22). In one respect, party government provides a solution to this problem. With party rather than the individual candidate the object of identification, electorally attractive members of the party team can draw support for administratively competent individuals. This is evident both in Britain, where unexciting candidates can be given safe seats (or life peerages), and in list PR systems, where they can be given high list positions. On the other hand, at the highest levels electoral talents remain more important than administrative ability. The problem is magnified if, in order to prevent the establishment of

individual "fiefdoms" or for some other reason, ministers are rotated rapidly from one department to another and thus never develop substantial expertise.

While this may lead to "better" policy by making the political "amateurs" more dependent on the bureaucratic "professionals," only if the bureaucracy is particularly loyal to, and understanding of, the party government of the day can this be said to contribute to party capacity. Here there may be a trade-off between capable government and party government. Similarly, rotation of ministers may further party unity by encouraging leaders to take a broader view, but does so at the expense of intimate party involvement in the making of specific policies.

The political heads of party governments are transient while the bureaucracy is permanent. Capable government requires the cooperation of bureaucrats. Yet the electoral responsibilities of a party give them an incentive to blame the bureaucracy for their failures. An example from the United States illustrates this problem. Said President Kennedy before taking a foreign policy initiative, "I hope this plan works. If it does, it will be another White House success. If it doesn't, it will be another State Department failure" (Cleveland, 1972: 95-96). Under these circumstances, self-defense by the civil service is more likely than loyalty.

Dependence on electoral support is a necessary condition for responsible party government. Nonetheless, if this dependence leads to obsession with day-by-day changes in popularity, it can lead to paralysis. Many policies involve immediate costs that must be borne in order

to achieve future benefits. If temporary declines in public approval are likely to disrupt the leadership's hold over the party, such policies, even when needed or rewarding in the long run, are unlikely to be pursued.

The will to govern is also undermined if the goal of maintaining party unity must be given substantially higher priority than policy goals. Party government is government by a team. This creates problems of coordination and internal politics. Cabinet ministers, for example, ordinarily owe their official positions at least in part to their independent personal support within the party; if a single party leader could ignore one or two of them, he can hardly ignore them all and expect to remain as leader. Policy must be formed through a continuous process of negotiation and accommodation, a process hardly calculated to achieve consistent or entirely efficient results.

Party government breeds a crisis mentality and a tendency never to deal with a problem before it becomes a crisis. Personal rewards for resolving a crisis, which is obvious, are greater than for avoiding one, which is not. The status, power, and budgets of those who must deal with crises, whether they are successful or not, are greater than those given to merely "competent administrators." The internal compromises necessary to policy making are easier to achieve in a crisis, when the need for an immediate decision is clear, than at other times. Promoting a feeling of crisis can be an effective strategy for mobilising public support and maintaining party unity.

Conclusions

The central message of this paper is that party government should be explained and its future projected by focussing on the people who make up the parties, and especially on the party leaders who also fill the central governing roles if there is party government, as individuals rather than on the parties as institutions. Although party government may be "functional" for a democratic system, adherence to the party government model as well as the very existence of political parties comes about, if at all, not because of this but because individuals pursuing their personal goals find party and party government to be rewarding. Prediction and explanation must be based on the goals being pursued by those in power and the relative effectiveness of alternative strategies open to them as determined by resources, environmental conditions, and the goals, strategies, and resources of competing actors. The specific hypotheses or suggestions raised above illustrate this approach and need not be repeated here.

If all relevant actors adhered to the norms of party government, the capacity and survivability of the system would be limited only by the wisdom of voters and politicians. Moreover, if the social preconditions tacitly assumed by the party government model were met and its conception of democracy accepted, the result would be democratic as well. The problems are that the social preconditions of the model are satisfied decreasingly by postindustrial societies, that the party government conception of democracy is debatable, and that given conflicting goals between party and nonparty actors, among individuals

within each party, and even within a single individual, a structure of incentives encouraging party government-like behavior often is lacking.

The negative consequences of ineffective government touch everyone in society. Interest groups, media, voters, and politicians all have a long term interest in avoiding system collapse. They do not necessarily have an interest in party government, and certainly may have no interest in the survival of the current party system. Even leaders of the currently dominant parties have other interests as well. The problem of party government, as of all systems of government, is to arrange a structure of incentives that encourages politicians to value long term policy and governing goals over short term power and personal goals; the paradox is that many features of the party government model naturally incline them the other way.

Notes

[1]Throughout this paper, I intend to limit attention to democratic governments, thus ignoring questions of whether totalitarian parties are properly parties and whether government by such parties is party government. For a discussion of these issues, see Sartori (1976).

[2]Ronald Rogowski (1974: 32). When the individuals in question are in competition, as in the economy or electoral politics, one ground for believing that they will behave, for whatever reason, as if they were making careful cost-benefit calculations is that those who do not behave "rationally" will not survive.

[3]An appealing way to conceive and measure party government would be to identify the goals of those parties in power and the goals of rival organisations or structures, and then to compare outcomes with those goals; the closer the fit of results to party goals, the more party government there must have been. This approach is precluded, however, by the indeterminacy of the goals of the party.

[4]The term "system" is used here only to mean the collection of political institutions and activities. It is not meant to imply any of the systematic interconnections implicit in systems theory or the systems approach.

[5]See Ostrogorski (1964). This view contrasts with Eldersveld's (1964: 2) assertion that "Parties came into existence to perform certain functions for the system."

[6]Systems with plural executives, even if directly elected, would be more like parliamentary systems. The same would be true where a presi-

dent was elected by an independent electoral college (e.g., Finland).

[7]This means only that generalisations about the behavior of parties and party politicians or activists may not apply to these groups, and does not imply any normative judgment about them.

[8]Entrusting courts with rule making authority thus violates this condition of party government unless the judges are chosen in partisan elections or removable in the normal course of politics. Recognition of this suggests that strict adherence to the norms of party government may not be entirely desirable.

[9]Lijphart's (1975) description of consociationalism in the Netherlands as government by elite cartel fits nicely with the party government model to the extent that party elites were the leading figures in each social pillar. The Swiss system described by Steiner (1974) fits far less well.

[10]Although clearly a difficult problem, the importance of distinguishing between policies as means and final end states as desiderata is underlined by Robertson (1976).

[11]The term "supersession" is borrowed from Smith (1982). My use of it, however, while strongly influenced by his, is not identical to it. See below.

[12]Whether such organisations should be called parties within the framework suggested above is irrelevant here. The point is simply to demonstrate that political activity is often motivated by desires other than office.

[13]The first phrase is John F. Kennedy's (1956); the second is from William S. Gilbert, The Mikado.

[14]LaPalombara (1964: chap. 9) uses the Italian term "parentela"

(literally, kinsfolk) to describe the latter strategy.

[15]The problem is made more difficult by the fact that expectations affect behavior. Thus optimistic economic forecasts may be a means of influencing economic behavior.

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Table 1: Futures of Party Government, Adapted from Smith (1981; 1982).

Survival	Adapability: High	Adapability: Low
Yes	High Associational: The associative description derives from the way in which party government proves flexible enough to accommodate itself to new institutional forms and responsive to social demands. But that flexibility does not jeopardise the prime position of party government. On the contrary, the established parties and party government enjoy a widely-based legitimacy.	Immobilistic: [The] system...is unable to meet new social demands or make adjustments in its own structure which would be in accord with developments elsewhere in society. This lack of flexibility and absence of innovatory power is, however, combined with the pristine purity of party government. It is possible that legitimacy will decline, but alternatives are not available.
No	Supersession: [A] creeping penetration of the party government arena...effectively leads to its abdication. The word 'effectively' points to the nature of the transference, for it is not the case that the apparatus and formal powers of party government are themselves supplanted, but rather that they give an increasingly false impression of the real power relationships.	Rupture: A break with party government is implied and its replacement by an entirely different kind of regime, whether democratic or not. The approaching demise is signalled by the inability of party government to accommodate changes in society and its legitimacy suffers accordingly.

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